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THE POLITICAL (SCIENCE) CONTEXT OF JUDGING 
LEE EPSTEIN, JACK KNIGHT & ANDREW D. MARTIN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For at least two decades now, the legal academy has made extensive use of 
the theories and tools of the economist.  Though not all in the law world view 
this as happy development, few would deny its importance.  Indeed, the 
integration of law and economics is so complete that nary a substantive area of 
law remains untouched; nary a law curriculum fails to house a course on the 
subject; and nary a law faculty lacks a specialist, if not a Ph.D., in economics. 
The same could not be said of political science.  In recent years, theories 
regularly bandied about by political scientists—such as “the attitudinal model” 
and “the strategic account”—and data sources that we regularly use—such as 
“The Spaeth Database”—are now making appearances in the law reviews, but 
“recent” is the operative word.  It has been in only the last few years that law 
professors have shown much interest in political science approaches to 
judging; and that interest is spotty to say the least.1 
That is why we so appreciate Professor Merrill’s effort.  From top to 
bottom, he consciously seeks to engage political scientists in ways that are 
virtually unknown in the law world.2  He has gone to great lengths to 
 
* Lee Epstein is the Edward Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor of Political 
Science, Chair of the Department of Political Science, and Professor of Law at Washington 
University in St. Louis; Jack Knight is the Sidney W. Souers Professor of Government at 
Washington University in St. Louis; Andrew D. Martin is Assistant Professor of Political Science 
at Washington University.  We thank the National Science Foundation (grants SES-0079963 and 
SES-0135855) and the Center for New Institutional Social Science for supporting our work on 
strategic decision making, and adapt several passages in this essay from some of that work. 
 1. See, e.g., Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635 (1998); Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and 
Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1999); Gregory 
C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial 
Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998). 
 2. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 572 (2003) (“[I]n discussing some recent developments on the 
Rehnquist Court . . . I hope to stimulate political scientists to take a closer look at the changing 
behavior of the Rehnquist Court, using their superior empirical and model-building skills.”); see 
also id. at 573 (“Indeed, if I accomplish nothing else in this Lecture, I hope I can inspire political 
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understand (what is largely) our literature and to apply (what are largely) our 
tools to illuminate an intriguing phenomenon.  Moreover, at the end of the day, 
he tells us something really fascinating about the current Supreme Court, “The 
Rehnquist Court(s).” 
These are some of the many assets of Professor Merrill’s lecture.  As is 
probably the case for all pioneering efforts, however, it also has its share of 
deficits.  Mainly, we think that in future research, he—and indeed, other legal 
academics—might make even better use of our theories and technologies by 
gaining a firmer grasp on the overall “political science” project, developing a 
more nuanced understanding of our leading theoretical accounts, and assessing 
the implications of those accounts against more reliable and valid data via 
more appropriate methodology. 
That Professor Merrill’s work could be improved with greater attention to 
these matters comes as no surprise.  We need only think of the initial works 
invoking theories and methods of economics: many were less than adequate 
adoptions or adaptations, evincing a lack of understanding of even the basics of 
the prevailing paradigm in that field.  Years later, perhaps as a result of more 
training, deep reading, and the influx of economists into the legal academy, 
that has changed.  The law journals are now replete with enlightened and 
enlightening studies relying, in part or in whole, on the theories or tool of 
economics. 
We believe, as does Professor Merrill, that political science has at least as 
much to add to our understanding of law-related phenomena, but we hope that 
it does not take as long for legal academics to develop an appreciation of our 
world, and that Professor Merrill’s paper is only the first in what will, without 
doubt, be a long and fruitful dialogue between political scientists and legal 
academics. 
Professor Merrill has done a great service by starting the conversation.  We 
would like to push it even further by clarifying what it is that we political 
scientists do and by exploring our work within the context of Professor 
Merrill’s Lecture.  At times we are critical, but by no means do we wish to 
undermine his research.  Quite the opposite: We only seek to demonstrate how 
he might bolster some of his claims with greater attention to theory and data. 
II.  POLITICAL SCIENTISTS AND JUDGING: THE NATURE OF OUR PROJECT 
While it almost never comes as a surprise to political scientists that legal 
academics know a lot about judging, the converse does not always hold.  In our 
many conversations with law professors, we have learned that a significant 
number do not realize that political scientists even study courts and law, much 
less know something about them. 
 
scientists to take up the differences in the Rehnquist Court before and after 1994 as an appropriate 
subject for further investigation.”). 
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Professor Merrill is, of course, an exception, and there are some, perhaps 
even a growing number, of others.  Their size, however, remains small, and 
even among the hardy few exist some misunderstandings about the nature of 
our project.  In what follows, we undertake a clarification.  We begin with a bit 
of history about disciplinary interest in the subject of judging and then outline 
the three primitives of work—questions, theory, and data—with some attention 
to how Professor Merrill’s makes use of them. 
Our emphasis on “bit” and “outline” is no mistake.  We do not intend to 
provide a review of the vast literature political scientists have produced on 
judging; others already have done that.3  Nor do we aim to offer a 
comprehensive guide to the rules and guidelines that govern our research 
program; this too has been produced.4  Our goals are rather far more modest: to 
provide a flavor of our project just large enough to retain the interest of the 
Professor Merrills in the legal academy—those already familiar with some its 
features—and just ample enough to whet the appetites of others. 
A. Some Historical Notes 
Interest in judging among political scientists is both quite old and relatively 
new.  The regular appearance of articles with titles such as Constitutional Law 
in 1909-1910: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the October Term, 19095 is a testament to the long-standing 
tradition of scholarship in this area, as are the many books and essays produced 
 
 3. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); JEFFREY A. 
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 
(2002); Lawrence Baum, What Judges Want: Judges’ Goals and Judicial Behavior, 47 POL. RES. 
Q. 749 (1994); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A 
Look Back, A Look Ahead, 53 POL. RES. Q. 625 (2000). 
 4. See GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994); Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1 (2002). 
 5. Eugene Wambaugh, Constitutional Law in 1909-1910: The Constitutional Decisions of 
the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1909, 4 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 483 
(1910).  This article, published in an early volume of the discipline’s flagship journal, the 
American Political Science Review, proved “so popular,” as Thomas G. Walker writes, 
that the APSR decided to make it an annual event, a tradition that continued for the next 
forty years.  A series of distinguished scholars were [sic] commissioned to write these 
pieces: Weinbaugh [sic] (1910-1912), Emlin McClain (1915), Thomas Reed Powell 
(1918-1920), Edward S. Corwin (1920-1924), Robert E. Cushman (1925-1928), Robert J. 
Harris (1950-1951), and David Fellman (1949, 1952-1961).  The Western Political 
Quarterly published a similar annual review, for years written by Paul Bartholomew, 
which ran until 1972.  In addition, a regular feature in every issue of the early volumes of 
the APSR was a compilation “Decisions of American Courts on Points of Public Law,” 
edited by Robert E. Cushman. 
Thomas G. Walker, The Development of the Field 1 (Nov. 11, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with the authors). 
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by scholars such as Reed Powell, Edward S. Corwin, and Robert Cushman (all 
of whom served as presidents of the American Political Science Association). 
Truth be told, however, there was nothing very political science-like about 
these early works; most were doctrinal pieces that could have—perhaps should 
have—been written by law professors of the day.  In fact, the “political 
science” authors of some of these works went so far as explicitly to reject 
politics.  Cushman’s examination of the 1936-37 Term—one of the most 
volatile in Supreme Court history—is exemplary.  After acknowledging that 
the “1936 term . . . will probably be rated a notable one,” he enumerated some 
of the facts “one should bear in mind,” such as the facts Roosevelt had won a 
landslide reelection and had submitted his Court-packing plan.6  Rather than 
demonstrate how those “facts” might have affected Court decisions, however, 
Cushman simply noted that “[n]o suggestion is made as to what inferences, if 
any, may be drawn from them.”7 
Not until the 1940s did our scholarship begin to move from “law-like” to 
“politics-laden” (though, we must admit, some among us still churn out the 
former).  That transformation came about largely as a result of the efforts of 
one scholar, C. Herman Pritchett, who may be virtually unknown in the law 
world but whose work remains a powerful presence in ours.  What Pritchett 
did, in some sense, was to move legal realism from the sole province of law 
schools to the corridors of political science departments.8  Like some 
proponents of socio-legal jurisprudence,9 he argued that judges are “motivated 
by their own preferences.”10  To put this in today’s parlance, he was probably 
the first political scientist to view judges as “single-minded seekers of legal 
policy”11—an assumption about jurists’ goals that continues, as we describe 
later, to stand as a hallmark of the political science approach to judging. 
In another sense, though, Pritchett did far more than transport legal 
realism, lock, stock, and barrel, to our discipline.  For one thing, Pritchett, 
unlike most of the realists, was a conscious and quantitative empiricist.12  Not 
 
 6. Robert E. Cushman, Constitutional Law in 1936-37: The Constitutional Decisions of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1936, 32 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 278, 278 
(1938). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 3, at 86-89. 
 9. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN 
JUSTICE (1949); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE 
BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1951). 
 10. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND 
VALUES, 1937-1947, at xii-xiii (1948). 
 11. Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323, 325 (1992). 
 12. For classic examples, see PRITCHETT, supra note 10; C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of 
Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 890 
(1941). 
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only did he assess his arguments against numerical data, but his research 
actually derives from a simple empirical observation (one that we depict in 
Figure 1): dissents were beginning, in the 1930s and 1940s, to accompany 
many Supreme Court decisions.  It was that observation that led Pritchett to the 
obvious question: If precedent drives Court decisions, as many in political 
science and law maintained, then why did various Justices in interpreting the 
same legal provisions consistently reach different conclusions on important 
questions of the day?  It was that question that led him to the same solution 
upon which the realists happened: rules based on precedent were little more 
than smokescreens behind which judges hide their values. 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
Percentage of U.S. Supreme Court Cases with at Least One Dissenting 
Opinion, 1800-2000 Terms13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unlike his colleagues in the law schools, however, Pritchett attempted to 
confirm this claim—the realists’ intuition—with data he mined from the voting 
records of the Justices, which he analyzed with then-sophisticated 
methodological tools.  It was Pritchett who first systematically examined 
dissents and voting blocs on the Court; he was also the first to invoke left-right 
 
 13. The data underlying Figure 1 were taken from LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME 
COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS 211-15 tbl.3-2 (3rd ed. 2003). 
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voting scales to study ideological behavior.  That Pritchett was able to place 
Justices of the Roosevelt Court on continuums, such as the one depicted in 
Figure 2, helped him substantiate his claim that political attitudes have a strong 
influence on judicial decisions. 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
Pritchett’s Left-Right Continuum of Justices Serving Between 1939 and 194114 
  
     Black  Douglas         Murphy   Reed  Frankfurter Court  Reed   Stone          Hughes     Roberts   McReynolds 
 
 
 
Left Right 
 
There is yet a second distinctive feature of Pritchett’s work: while it may 
draw on the insights of the realists to make sense of dissents, it does not stop 
with their writings.  To Pritchett (and, later, his student, Walter F. Murphy), if 
Justices are single-minded seekers of policy, they necessarily care about the 
“law,” broadly defined.  Furthermore, if they care about the ultimate state of 
the law, then they may be willing to modulate their views to avoid an extreme 
reaction from Congress and the President.15  Pritchett (and, again, Murphy), in 
other words, tells a tale of shrewd Justices, who anticipate the reactions of the 
other institutions and take those reactions into account in their decision 
making.  The Justices he depicts would rather hand down a ruling that comes 
close to, but may not exactly reflect, their preferences than, in the long run, see 
other political actors completely override their decisions. 
Those who already have heard or read Professor Merrill’s lecture can 
probably now understand one reason why Pritchett is such a towering figure in 
our discipline.  He injected “politics” into the study of courts and, in so doing, 
provided the fodder for the two most influential contemporary political 
accounts of judicial behavior: the attitudinal model and the strategic account, 
both of which figure into Professor Merrill’s narrative.  However different 
these accounts may be—and they certainly are—both can be traced to 
Pritchett.16 
 
 14. Pritchett, supra note 12, at 894.  Reed appears twice because his dissents were divided 
between the liberal and conservative wings of the Court.  Id. at 895. 
 15. See WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT (1962); C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, 
CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT, 1957-1960 (1961). 
 16. On the other hand, we do not want to overstate Pritchett’s contemporary importance. 
While he is without doubt the founder of the modern-day political science project on judging, 
others more fully developed what he began.  For their contributions, see THE PIONEERS OF 
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003). 
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We have more to say about these soon but we should not gloss over other 
reasons for Pritchett’s influence that may be less transparent from Professor 
Merrill’s work.  Certainly one centers on what Pritchett studied: judicial 
decision making.  Another concerns his use of data to assess the implications 
of his approach.  These, along with theory, deserve some discussion—not 
solely because of the contributions Pritchett made, but also because they 
represent the primitives of the political science project of judging.  To 
appreciate that project—as well as Professor Merrill’s contribution to it—it is 
important to have a baseline appreciation of these three dimensions. 
B. What We Study: Judicial Decision Making 
Pritchett was fascinated by the question of why judges reach the decisions 
that they do, and that question remains at the core of the contemporary political 
science project on judging.  This is not to say that we ignore other features of 
judicial politics.  Our ability to summon innumerable citations to research 
examining the selection of judges and Justices,17 the views of the public about 
courts,18 and the impact of judicial decisions19 confirms that we do not.20  It is, 
however, to say that studies of judicial decision making continue to dominate 
the disciplinary program. 
In reporting this, we hope to convey two features of the political scientists’ 
work.  First, as our stress on why indicates, our research is largely non-
normative.  Many of us are not all that interested in debating questions of how 
should judges reach decisions; rather, we are interested in how and why they 
do reach decisions.  Still, we hasten to note, our research is not wholly devoid 
 
 17. See, e.g., DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND 
THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., A Spatial Model 
of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court 
Confirmations, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 96 (1992); Charles M. Cameron et al., Senate Voting on 
Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525 (1990). 
 18. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and The U.S. Supreme Court: FDR’s 
Court-Packing Plan, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1139 (1987); Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. 
Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635 (1992); 
Valerie J. Hoekstra & Jeffrey A. Segal, The Shepherding of Local Public Opinion: The Supreme 
Court and Lamb’s Chapel, 58 J. POL. 1079 (1996). 
 19. See, e.g., CHARLES A. JOHNSON & BRADLEY C. CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: 
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (1984); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY 
REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE 
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
 20. Then again, all three of these subjects—judicial nominations, public opinion, and 
impact—have potential ties to judicial decision making.  For essays making these sorts of 
connections, see Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova, The Role of Constitutional Courts 
in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 117 (2002); Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 87 (1996); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Buyer Beware?: Presidential Success Through 
Supreme Court Appointments, 53 POL. RES. Q. 557 (2000). 
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of normative implications.21  To see this, we need only consider studies that 
demonstrate the effect of ideology on judicial decisions; surely, such a finding 
has important implications for debates about the selection and retention of 
jurists.22  We could say the same of research investigating whether women 
judges bring a “different voice” to the bench,23 whether jurists respond 
differentially to distinct classes of litigants,24 and whether elected political 
actors exert some constraint on the decisions of non-elected judges25—to name 
just three others. 
The second feature we want to convey is that our concerns, on some level, 
are fairly narrow.  To be sure, there are handfuls of interesting (and even 
influential) studies of things other than judicial decision making—again, the 
selection of judges and the impact of their decisions come readily to mind.  For 
the most part, however, the vast majority of serious theoretical and empirical 
research conducted by political scientists centers on judicial decision making. 
Yet this focus, for several reasons, is less narrow than it might seem.  First, 
to political scientists decision making encompasses questions covering a range 
of judicial behaviors: from why judges on discretionary courts make the case-
selection decisions that they do;26 to how judges interpret constitutional and 
 
 21. This holds whether we choose to develop them or not (as is too often the case). 
 22. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 3; Segal et al., supra note 20. 
 23. This is a rather large literature. For relatively recent reviews, see Lee Epstein, Beverly 
Blair Cook, in WOMEN IN LAW: A BIO-BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SOURCEBOOK 51 (Rebecca Mae 
Salokar & Mary L. Volcansek eds., 1996); Daniel M. Schneider, Empirical Research on Judicial 
Reasoning: Statutory Interpretation in Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325 (2001); Michael 
E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking Feminist Judging, 70 IND. L.J. 891 (1995). 
 24. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal?: Upperdogs 
and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 235 (1992); S. Sidney 
Ulmer, Selecting Cases for Supreme Court Review: An Underdog Model, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
902 (1978). 
 25. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Supreme Court as a 
Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583 (2001); Lee Epstein & Thomas G. Walker, 
The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society: Playing the Reconstruction Game, in 
CONTEMPLATING COURTS 315 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995); John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, 
Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992) [hereinafter 
Ferejohn & Weingast, Limitation of Statutes]; John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, A Positive 
Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT’L REV. LAW & ECON. 263 (1992) [hereinafter Ferejohn 
& Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation]; Andrew D. Martin, Public Policy, the 
Supreme Court, and the Separation of Powers (Sept. 1, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the authors). 
 26. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda 
Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988); Gregory A. Caldeira et 
al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549 
(1999); Joseph Tanenhaus et al., The Supreme Court’s Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in 
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 111 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963). 
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statutory provisions;27 to reasons underlying their votes on the merits of 
cases;28 to what attempts judges make to induce compliance with their specific 
rulings as well as to gain respect for their institution;29 and just about 
everything and anything in between. 
Second, our focus covers more actors than simply judges making decisions 
at a particular moment in time.  To explain why jurists make the case-selection 
choices that they do, we must look beyond the petitions that come to them, to 
the actors who brought them and the interest groups that support them.30  To 
understand why judges interpret statutes or the Constitution in particular ways, 
we cannot ignore the role played by contemporaneous Congresses and 
executives.31  To appreciate votes on collegial courts, we can hardly neglect 
the role played by doctrine created by previous judges.32  To investigate 
matters of compliance and legitimacy, we must contemplate the views of the 
public and the effects of those views on other political actors.33 
Finally, our concentration on decision making encompasses more than 
political explanations.  Politics may lie at the root of many accounts of judicial 
decisions, but as scientists (and not advocates) we more than appreciate other 
explanations; we realize that unless we contemplate rival accounts we cannot 
reach conclusions with any degree of certainty about our own.34  What this 
 
 27. See, e.g., Ferejohn & Weingast, Limitation of Statutes, supra note 25; McNollgast, 
Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at 3 (1994); McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive 
Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631 (1995) [hereinafter 
McNollgast, Politics and the Courts]; James Meernik & Joseph Ignagni, Judicial Review and 
Coordinate Construction of the Constitution, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 447 (1997); Jeffrey A. Segal, 
Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 28 (1997). 
 28. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 3; C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of 
Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics 
Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355 (1981). 
 29. See, e.g., JOHNSON & CANON, supra note 19; Knight & Epstein, supra note 20. 
 30. See, e.g., Caldeira & Wright, supra note 26; Caldeira et al., supra note 26. 
 31. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); Epstein, 
Knight & Martin, supra note 25; Meernik & Ignagni, supra note 27.  For a different view, see 
Segal, supra note 27. 
 32. See Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018 
(1996).  For a different view, see HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR 
MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999). 
 33. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira, Courts and Public Opinion, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: 
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 304 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991); Caldeira, supra 
note 18; Epstein, Knight & Shvetsova, supra note 20. 
 34. If scholars ignore competing explanations, their work will suffer from what is known as 
“omitted variable bias,” making any causal inferences they reach suspect.  Specifically, scholars 
must take into account (that is, control for or hold constant) variables designed to control for the 
implications of other theories that do not necessarily square with theirs (that is, rival 
explanations or hypotheses) if the rival variable meets one of the following conditions: (1) it is 
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means, at least for the political science project on judging, is that we are not 
simply the “bean counters” or “reductionists” of which we are occasionally 
accused.  If we want to say that the courts involved in Bush v. Gore35 reached 
decisions on the basis of the partisan preferences, we cannot begin and end our 
research with counts of the number of Democratic judges who voted for Gore 
and the number of Republican judges who voted for Bush; we must also 
examine the existing state of precedent, as well as the many other factors, 
whether political or not, that may have come into play.36  If we want to say that 
briefs filed by the Solicitor General increase the odds of the Supreme Court 
granting certiorari, we must control for all the other “variables” that we believe 
affect the Court’s decision, again, whether political or not.37  Likewise, to 
provide just one last example, if we want to say that political attitudes 
determine votes, we cannot stop with a demonstration of a correlation between 
attitudes and votes; we also must take into account the legal facts at issue.38 
Seen in this way, Professor Merrill’s research both does and does not fit 
comfortably within the political science project of judging.  On the one hand, 
Professor Merrill is, as we are, concerned with various features of judicial 
decision making.  Virtually none of the behaviors he identifies as altering 
between the first and second Rehnquist Courts have escaped the attention of 
political scientists.  Vast bodies of literature exist on the Court’s agenda,39 
coalition formation,40 voting splits,41 and so on. 
On the other hand, and ironically enough, Professor Merrill pushes our 
emphasis on politics further than we do.  Take, for example, his assessment of 
the separation of powers model, which considers whether or not the Court 
agreed with the position taken by the Solicitor General.  When he finds, in 
 
related to (correlated with) the key causal variable; (2) it has an effect on the dependent variable; 
(3) it is causally prior to (for example, preceding in time) the key causal variable.  For more 
details, see Epstein & King, supra note 4. 
 35. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 36. See, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED: HOW THE COURT DECIDED 
THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001). 
 37. See, e.g., Caldeira & Wright, supra note 26. 
 38. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 3. 
 39. See, e.g., CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND 
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); Caldeira & Wright, supra note 26; 
Caldeira et al., supra note 26; Lee Epstein et al., Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United States 
Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (2002). 
 40. See, e.g., DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 
(1976); David W. Rohde, Policy Goals and Opinion Coalitions in the Supreme Court, 16 
MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 208 (1972). 
 41. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Of Time and Consensual Norms 
in the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 874 (1998); Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Consensus 
on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362 (2001); Thomas G. Walker et al., On the 
Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361 
(1988). 
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contrast to the “prediction” generated by his version of the model, that the 
“conservative majority” on the first Rehnquist Court was not “especially 
deferential to the conservative administration,” he suggests the possibility that 
“the Court was not being very strategic during this period.”42 
This conclusion—not to mention Professor Merrill’s understanding and 
assessment of the model—is problematic in several regards, and we visit them 
soon enough.  Most relevant here is Professor Merrill’s failure to take into 
account other factors—especially apolitical factors—that might have caused 
the Court to reach the decisions that it did.43  Without a consideration of these, 
not only does he fail to shed as much light on the phenomenon as he would 
like, he also opens himself up to precisely the same charges that have been 
leveled at political scientists: that we are mere “number crunchers” who focus 
too much on politics to the exclusion of law and “ideas.” 
C. Theory and Its Observable Implications 
If the political science project on judging is primarily aimed at answering 
questions pertaining to judicial decision making (broadly defined), then theory 
and its observable implications (sometimes called hypotheses or expectations) 
are crucial tools for enabling us to accomplish this goal.  By “theory,” we 
mean “a reasoned and precise speculation about the answer to a research 
question”;44 by “observable implications,” we mean things that we would 
expect to detect in the real world if our theory is right.  To assess a feminist 
theory of judging, say, one that holds that women judges speak in a different 
voice, we would need to write down all the observable implications of the 
theory—for example, women judges are more likely to strike down laws that 
categorize on the basis of gender—and then evaluate those implications against 
data.  To assess a partisan theory of judging, we would likewise need to record 
all the possible implications—for example, Democratic judges are more likely 
to support positions advocated by Democratic candidates in litigation—and so 
too assess them against data.  Only by comparing the theoretical implications 
with some relevant empirical observations can we learn whether the theory 
likely is to be correct. 
The importance of theory and its observable implications has not been 
missed by political scientists who study courts.  Indeed, theorizing about 
judging has, since the days of Pritchett, become something of a cottage 
industry.  Prior to his research, the vast majority of studies lacked any.  Many 
were simply doctrinal analyses of the products of judicial deliberations—that 
 
 42. Merrill, supra note 2, at 626-27. 
 43. Exemplars are George & Epstein, supra note 11; Jeffrey A. Segal & Cheryl D. Reedy, 
The Supreme Court and Sex Discrimination: The Role of the Solicitor General, 41 W. POL. Q. 
553 (1988). 
 44. KING ET AL., supra note 4, at 19 (emphasis added). 
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is, decisions and opinions—that were heavy on the doctrine, short on analysis, 
and devoid of theoretical underpinnings.  As Thomas G. Walker has written, 
however, all that changed in the late-1950s and early 1960s: “Theoretical 
innovation exploded.  Attitude theory, social background theory, role theory, 
fact pattern analysis, and others were used in attempts to explain judicial 
decision making.”45  To Walker’s list, we—writing in 2003—could add dozens 
more that scholars now invoke to guide their work on courts and judges. 
1. A Simple Theory: The Attitudinal Model 
Almost needless to write then, there is no “one” theory of judging, much 
less a unifying paradigm, to which all political scientists subscribe.  Theories 
come in many types, levels of abstraction, and substantive applications.  Some 
on Walker’s list, for example, are simple, small, or tailored to fit particular 
circumstances, perhaps seeking to account for only one aspect of judicial 
decision making or but a single Court. 
One that Professor Merrill invokes—the contemporary version of 
Pritchett’s preference-based theory of judging, known as the attitudinal 
model—is such a theory.  It simply says this: the votes of judges on the merits 
of cases will reflect their sincerely-held ideological (read: liberal or 
conservative) attitudes over particular matters of public policy if (1) those 
judges lack political or electoral accountability, (2) have no ambition for 
higher office, and (3) serve on a court of last resort that controls its own 
agenda.46  The sole goal of this theory, then, is to explain the votes Justices of 
 
 45. Walker, supra note 5, at 5. 
 46. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 3, for the clearest account of the attitudinal model. 
  As Professor Merrill notes, of all the accounts political scientists invoke to explain 
features of judicial decision making, this model has perhaps come under the most fire from legal 
academics.  Merrill, supra note 2, at 591.  While we do not subscribe to this approach, we do 
believe that some of this criticism is unwarranted, as it seems to stem from a lack of 
understanding of the model rather than a serious consideration of its merits.  For example, the 
account is not as reductionist as some legal scholars have alleged: it does not merely say that 
liberal judges will always vote in the liberal direction or that all conservatives will always cast 
conservative votes; rather, it places emphasis on “the facts of . . . case[s] vis-à-vis . . . ideological 
attitudes.”  SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 3, at 86; see also id. at 110.  No adherent of the 
attitudinal model, in other words, would say that underlying left-right political attitudes fully 
explain votes or outcomes.  They would instead say that case facts “juxtaposed against . . . [the] 
personal policy preferences [of judges]” determine how any particular judge reaches a decision in 
any particular case.  Id. at 312. 
  A simple example suffices to make the point.  Let us suppose that we could order the 
facts in cases involving searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment from the least to the 
most intrusive search, as illustrated in the figure below, adapted from Segal and Spaeth.  Id. at 
326.  Further suppose that we could order Justices along that same continuum, from most liberal 
to most conservative according to their indifference points.  Now, if we were to spin the 
attitudinal model in accord with much of the legal literature, we would simply say that Justice 
Brennan would vote to strike down all searches, Justice Rehnquist would vote to uphold all 
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the United States Supreme Court cast on the merits of cases.  It does not 
attempt to account for votes made by judges on other American courts because 
no jurists other than United States Supreme Court Justices meet the conditions 
of the model.  Moreover, it only attempts to account for votes cast on the 
merits of cases; no other judicial choices (even and including votes on 
certiorari) come under its reach. 
That is why we are troubled by Professor Merrill’s conclusion that the 
attitudinal model cannot explain many of the differences he identifies between 
the first and second Rehnquist Courts, including the “decline in emphasis on 
social issues,” the “paucity of doctrinal innovations in cases involving social 
issues during the first Rehnquist Court,” “the collapse in the size of the Court’s 
docket,” and so on. 47  The model was not designed to explain these things, as 
even its most ardent supporters readily admit. 
This is not to say that the attitudinal account is useless to Professor Merrill 
in his quest to explore distinctions between the first and second Rehnquist 
Courts.  Quite the opposite: It could be exceptionally helpful in aiding 
Professor Merrill to discern whether differences do in fact (or should) emerge 
in the outcomes of cases produced by the first and second Rehnquist Courts.  
Professor Merrill could pursue this in any number of ways. 
A very simple one entails an examination of the median Justice over time.  
Assume, for a moment, that we can order the most preferred positions of the 
Justices over a particular policy area—whether federalism, “social issues,” or 
any other—from left (most “liberal”) to right (most “conservative”) on a single 
 
searches, and Justice Breyer would sometimes uphold and sometimes strike down searches.  This 
interpretation, however, misses a key variable in the attitudinal model: case facts.  On the 
attitudinal model, Justices do not simply vote willy-nilly in accord with their policy preferences.  
They will rather vote to uphold any search with facts placing it to the left of their indifference 
points and strike any search to the right.  Accordingly, yes, Rehnquist would have voted to 
sustain the searches at issue in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968), and United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), but he would not have supported the 
search at issue in a case that was to the right of his point (labeled in the figure “more intrusive 
case”).  Furthermore, yes, Brennan would have voted to strike the searches in the three cases, but 
not in the “less intrusive case.”  Finally, we need not guess about Breyer: he would uphold the 
searches in Leon and Terry, but not Mapp. 
 
 The Attitudinal Model: An Example 
Br enn a n Br eye r R e hn qu i s t 
Le ss M or e 
Le s s Le on T err y M a pp M or e 
I nt r u s i v e I nt r u s i v e 
C a s e C a s e Degree of Intrusiveness of Search  
 
 47. Merrill, supra note 2, at 601. 
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dimension, as we have done in Figure 3.  Further assume, as the attitudinal 
model does, that all Justices vote in a non-strategic fashion, (that is, in line 
with their sincere policy preferences) and that those preferences are single-
peaked.48  Under these conditions, the outcome of a case should reflect the 
preferences of the median Justice (here, Kennedy).  Hence, if we want to make 
a case for the existence of two Rehnquist Courts in terms of voting and 
outcomes—the only phenomena to which the attitudinal model speaks—we 
might examine whether we detect a change in the Court’s median. 
 
FIGURE 3 
 
Hypothetical Distribution of Preferences 
 
            Stevens  Ginsburg    Breyer     Souter            Kennedy   O’Connor    Rehnquist    Scalia    Thomas 
          
Left Right 
 
Do we observe such a change?  The answer, as Figure 4 shows, is a 
qualified yes.  This figure presents the Martin-Quinn estimated location of the 
median Justice, along with the identity of that Justice.49  Using these 
preferences scores, we find a significant difference in the average median 
Justice between the first and second Rehnquist Courts (0.799 versus 0.616; p = 
0.003).  Moreover, that key median position, occupied by (relative moderates) 
Justices White and Souter for much of the 1986-93 term period, now appears 
to belong chiefly to (relative conservatives) Kennedy and O’Connor.  
Accordingly, under the attitudinal model, we might anticipate policies 
produced by today’s Justices to reflect a more right-of-center orientation than 
they did some seven years ago.50 
 
 48. In other words, we assume that the actors prefer an outcome that is nearer to their ideal 
points than one that is further away, or to put it more technically, “beginning at [an actor’s] ideal 
point, utility always declines monotonically in any . . . direction.  This . . . is known as single-
peakedness of preferences.”  Keith Krehbiel, Spatial Models of Legislative Choice, 13 LEGIS. 
STUD. Q. 259, 263 (1988). 
 49. Martin and Quinn use voting data for all Justices serving on the Supreme Court from 
1937 to the present to estimate the preferred policy position, or revealed preference, of each 
Justice.  The model is dynamic, in that the policy preferences of the Justices are allowed to evolve 
throughout time.  By statistically controlling for different dockets, their data can be used to 
investigate the phenomenon of preference change.  Their modeling strategy also allows 
computing other quantities of interest, such as the location and identity of the median Justice.  See 
Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002). 
 50. For a qualification on this claim, see supra note 46. 
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FIGURE 4 
 
Justice Occupying the Median Position (Martin-Quinn Scores), 
1986-2000 Terms51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We respond with a qualified yes, however, because the onset of the move 
to the right appears to come well before the 1994 Term, perhaps as early as the 
1991 Term.  Between 1986 and 1990, the median position, largely held by 
Justice White, hovered around 0.865; for all subsequent Terms, it dropped by 
0.206, to 0.659 (p = 0.027).  This is a greater decline than that which occurred 
between Merrill’s first and second Rehnquist Courts, and may be directly 
attributable to Justice Thomas’s arrival and Justice Marshall’s departure. 
Seen in this way, Professor Merrill is exactly right to focus on Justice 
Thomas in his discussion of the attitudinal model.  He also seems right to 
center his comparison on the pre- and post-1994 terms.  While key alterations 
in preferences began before that, the full movement toward the right stabilized 
 
 51. The Martin-Quinn estimates of the policy preference for every Justice serving from 1937 
to the present, as well as the location of the median Justice, are available electronically.  See 
Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Ideal Points for the U.S. Supreme Court, available at 
http://adm.wustl.edu/supct.html (last updated Oct. 14, 2002). 
 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
798 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:783 
in 1994, with, as we noted above, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor vying for 
the median position rather than the more moderate Justices Souter and White.52 
2. A More Ambitious Approach: The Strategic Account 
While the attitudinal model is not particularly ambitious, we cannot say the 
same about the other primary theory Professor Merrill invokes: the strategic 
account.  This account—an increasingly common one in political science (as 
well as in legal) circles—belongs to a class of non-parametric rational choice 
models as it assumes that goal-directed actors operate in a strategic or 
interdependent decision making context.  Specifically, and in the context of 
judging, it holds that: (1) judges make choices in order to achieve certain 
goals; (2) judges act strategically in the sense that their choices depend on their 
expectations about the choices of other actors; and (3) these choices are 
structured by the institutional setting in which they are made.53 
Notice several differences between this strategic account and the attitudinal 
model.  One centers on goals.  Under the attitudinal model, Justices pursue one 
and only one goal: policy.  Under the strategic account, it is up to the 
researcher to specify a priori the actors’ goals; the researcher may select any 
motivation(s) she believes that the particular actors hold.  We emphasize this 
point because it is the source of a great deal of confusion in the literature, with 
some scholars suggesting that on the strategic account the only goal actors 
pursue entails policy. 
We understand the source of this confusion.  Virtually every existing 
strategic account of judicial decisions posits that Justices pursue policy, that is, 
their goal is to see public policy—the ultimate state of the law—reflect their 
preferences.  This includes Pritchett’s and Merrill’s work, as well as most of 
ours.  Again, however, this need not be the case; under the strategic account, 
researchers could posit any number of other goals, be they jurisprudential or 
institutional. 
Because so much confusion exists over this point, let us drive it home with 
the simple example shown in Figure 5.54  There, we depict a hypothetical set of 
preferences over a particular policy, say, a civil rights statute.  The horizontal 
lines represent a (civil rights) policy space, here, ordered from left (most 
“liberal”) to right (most “conservative”); the vertical lines show the 
preferences (the “most preferred positions”) of the actors relevant in this 
 
 52. This, of course, raises the question: To what extent did this change actually affect Court 
outcomes? Attitudinal advocates have several strategies for addressing this question, but one that 
would be relatively easy to deploy is the development of fact-pattern models.  See, e.g., SEGAL & 
SPAETH, supra note 3; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 53. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 31; see also generally, JON ELSTER, RATIONAL 
CHOICE (1986). 
 54. We adapt the discussion in this and the next paragraph from Ferejohn & Weingast, A 
Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, supra note 25. 
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example: the median member of the contemporaneous Congress (M) and of the 
key contemporaneous committees and other gatekeepers (C) in Congress that 
make the decision over whether to propose civil rights legislation to their 
respective houses.55  Note that we also identify the contemporaneous 
committees’ indifference point (C(M)) “where the [Supreme] Court can set 
policy which the committee likes no more than the opposite policy that would 
be chosen by the full chamber.”56  To put it another way, because the 
indifference point and the median member of current Congress are equidistant 
from the committees, the committees like the indifference point as much as 
they like the most preferred position of Congress; they are indifferent between 
the two.  Finally, we locate the status quo (X), which represents the intent of 
the legislature that enacted the law. 
 
FIGURE 5 
 
Hypothetical Set of Preferences over Civil Rights Policy57 
 
         X                   C(M)             M                   C 
 
Left Right 
 
Note: X is the status quo (the intent of the enacting Congress); C(M) represents 
the contemporaneous committees’ indifference point (between their most 
preferred position and that desired by M); M denotes the most preferred 
position of the median member of the contemporaneous Congress; and C is the 
most preferred position of the key contemporaneous committees (and other 
 
 55. In denoting these most preferred points, we again assume single-peaked preferences.  See 
supra note 48 and accompanying text.  We also assume, that the actors possess complete and 
perfect information about the preferences of all other actors and that the sequence of policy 
making enfolds as follows: the Court interprets a law, the relevant congressional committees 
propose (or do not propose) legislation to override the Court’s interpretation, Congress (if the 
committees propose legislation) enacts (or does not enact) an override bill, the President (if 
Congress acts) signs (or does not sign) the override bill, and Congress (if the President vetoes) 
overrides (or does not override) the veto. These are relatively common assumptions in the legal 
literature.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation 
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 377-87 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court 
Statutory Interpretation Decisions]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?: Playing the 
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, 
Reneging on History?]. 
 56. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, supra note 55, 
at 378. 
 57. Figure 5 is adapted from Ferejohn & Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory 
Interpretation, supra note 25. 
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gatekeepers) in Congress that make the decision of whether or not to propose 
legislation to their respective houses. 
Now suppose a Justice has a case before her that requires interpretation of 
a civil rights statute.  Where will she place policy?  The answer, under the 
attitudinal account, is simple: she will place policy precisely where her sincere 
preferences lie.  If her most preferred position is X, that is where she will vote; 
if it is C(M), she will choose that.  The answer on the strategic account is that it 
depends—it depends on her goal.  If she is motivated to see the outcome reflect 
as closely as possible her own policy preferences, she will interpret the law in 
the C(M)-C interval, with the exact placement contingent on the location of her 
ideal point.  Placing policy there, for reasons we explain momentarily, will 
deter a congressional attempt to overturn.  Now suppose rather that her goal is 
to interpret the law in line with the intent of the enacting legislature (that is, to 
follow a jurisprudence of legislative intent), but, at the same time, to avoid an 
override attempt by the current Congress.  If she were so motivated,58 then she 
will place policy at C(M). 
Notice that regardless of whether the Justice is motivated by policy or 
intent, under the strategic account she makes a decision in such a way that 
avoids a congressional override.  That is because she is driven to maximize her 
preferences (whatever they may be).  If she is inattentive to Congress, she risks 
a legislative overruling that places the law far from her most preferred 
position; if she is attentive, she can establish a policy close to, but not exactly 
on, her ideal point without risking adverse congressional reaction. 
This is the central intuition behind strategic behavior, and it brings us to 
yet another distinction between the attitudinal model and the strategic account.  
Simply put, the strategic account assumes that when goal-oriented Justices 
make their decisions they take into account the preferences and likely actions 
of other relevant actors—including their colleagues, elected officials, and the 
public.  The attitudinal model, however, assumes no such thing.  This is a 
crucial difference because it means, under the attitudinal model, that Justices 
always will behave in accord with their sincere preferences; under the strategic 
account, they will not necessarily do so.  Rather, whether they behave sincerely 
or in a sophisticated fashion (that is, in a way that is not compatible with their 
most preferred position) will depend on the preferences of the other relevant 
actors and they actions they are likely to take. 
To see why, let us return to Figure 5, and suppose that the median Justice’s 
policy preferences are identical to C(M).  The expectation, according to the 
attitudinal model, is that she will vote her sincere “attitudes,” here C(M).  The 
expectation under the strategic account is precisely the same but for a wholly 
different reason: she votes C(M), not exclusively because it is her most 
preferred position, but also because she has taken into account the 
 
 58. This assumes that the President and pivotal veto player in Congress are to the right of X. 
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configuration of preferences and realizes that the relevant congressional 
committees would have no incentive to override her.  Because their 
indifference point is the same as her most preferred position, they would be 
indifferent to the policy preferred by the Court.  Our Justice, thus, has made a 
strategic calculation, and that calculation has led her to see that she can vote 
sincerely.  Under the attitudinal model, even though she too votes sincerely, 
she has made no such calculation; she votes reflexively. 
Now consider another median Justice—one whose most preferred position 
is identical to X (the enacting Congress) in Figure 5.  How would this Justice 
vote?  Again, under the attitudinal model she would cast a sincere vote.  That 
such a vote would be to the left of the indifference point of the relevant 
committees, giving them every incentive to introduce legislation lying at their 
preferred point, matters not to her; actually, under the attitudinal model she 
never even bothers to make such a calculation.  She votes her attitudes without 
regard to the other pertinent players in the interaction.  Not so, however, under 
the strategic account.  If the Justice is concerned with seeing her vision of 
public policy becoming the law of the land, then we would expect her—given 
the distribution of the most preferred positions of the actors in this figure—to 
behave in a sophisticated fashion, placing policy not on its ideal point but near 
the committees’ indifference point.  That is the rational course of action—the 
best choice for a Justice interested in policy—because the committees are 
indifferent between that point and the most preferred position of the median 
member of Congress.  They would have no incentive to introduce legislation to 
overturn a policy set at the indifference point.  Thus, once again she would end 
up with a policy close to, but not exactly on, her ideal point without risking 
congressional reaction. 
There is yet one final distinction between the strategic account and the 
attitudinal model, and it is the one with which we started this section: the 
strategic account is the far more ambitious one.  It is not limited to explaining 
votes, and it is not limited to the Supreme Court. Indeed researchers have used 
it to address a long list of diverse research questions: from why judges on 
discretionary courts review some cases and not others;59 to whether the policy 
preferences of other political organizations (for example, the legislature and 
executive) influence judicial decisions;60 to what circumstances lead lower 
 
 59. See, e.g., Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic 
Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J. POL. 824 
(1995); Caldeira et al., supra note 26; Charles M. Cameron et al., Strategic Auditing in a Political 
Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 101 (2000). 
 60. See, e.g., Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, supra 
note 55; Eskridge, Reneging on History?, supra note 55; Segal, supra note 27; Pablo T. Spiller & 
Rafael Gely, Congressional Control of Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. 
Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988, 23 RAND J. ECON. 463 (1992). 
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courts to deviate from precedent established by higher courts.61  It also can, 
unlike the attitudinal model, shed light on why jurists create and maintain 
particular rules, norms, and conventions62—a point that Figure 6 shores up.  
There, we depict three choices confronting a Justice over which standard of 
review to apply in abortion cases.  Suppose a Justice was to select among the 
three possible alternatives; further suppose that she sincerely prefers 
“compelling interest” to “undue burden” to “rational basis.”  Which would she 
pick?  The attitudinal model, of course, cannot address this question as it 
pertains to a non-binary doctrinal choice.  The strategic account, however, can.  
It supposes that the Justice might choose “undue burden” if, depending on the 
preferences of the other players (for example, her colleagues), that would allow 
her to avoid “rational basis,” her least preferred outcome. 
 
FIGURE 6 
 
Choices of Legal Standard in Abortion Cases 
 
 
    Compelling Interest       Undue Burden               Rational Basis   
Less Restrictive More Restrictive 
 
Accordingly, when Professor Merrill attempts to use the strategic account 
to explain the Court’s agenda and doctrinal choices, its voting behavior, its 
support for the government, and so on, he is on firm ground—far firmer than 
his use of the attitudinal model.  Where his use of the account becomes more 
problematic, as we explain in the next section, is in how he derives observable 
implications from it. 
3. Deriving Observable Implications 
Among political scientists who study judges, the derivation of observable 
implications from theory is a controversial matter.  One school of thought 
holds that we can and even should do so loosely and intuitively, via informal 
 
 61. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court 
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial 
Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); McNollgast, Politics and the Courts, supra note 27; Donald 
R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-
Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994). 
 62. See, e.g., MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE 
ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (2000); Knight & Epstein, supra note 20; 
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication By A Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent 
in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605 (1995). 
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reasoning.  Some of our examples above illustrate this sort of thinking.  For 
example, if our theory holds that Justices reach decisions on the basis of their 
partisanship then it is not such a large leap to hypothesize that Democratic 
judges, controlling for all other relevant factors, should be more likely to 
support positions advocated by Democratic candidates.  Similarly, observable 
implications flowing from the attitudinal model also illustrate the derivation of 
observable implications in an intuitive, informal manner.  For example, if the 
model holds, we ought to find Justices voting in line with their sincerely held 
preferences over particular matters of public policy. 
This approach may be fine for some theories but it does not work well for 
others—including, and perhaps especially, strategic accounts of judging.  Too 
many studies invoking this account, in our estimation, develop their 
hypotheses through loose intuitions about strategy63—with Professor Merrill’s 
study being exemplary.  Via informal reasoning, Professor Merrill suggests 
that during the first Rehnquist Court we ought to see the Justices, if they are 
“strategic,” interpreting law in line with the President’s preferred positions (as 
expressed in briefs filed by the U.S. Solicitor General).  Why?  Because the 
President, however conservative he was, would modulate his views so as not to 
generate an override by Congress.  The Court, as conservative as the President, 
would thus adopt the Solicitor General’s positions because it would realize that 
those positions were about as far right as it could safely move without 
triggering a congressional override. 
We are troubled by this sort of “informal reasoning” approach for one 
simple reason: If scholars are interested in explaining particular decisions as 
the equilibrium outcome of the interdependent choices of the relevant actors—
as is Professor Merrill (along with so many other scholars who examine the 
“strategic” behavior of judges)—then they must demonstrate why the choices 
are in equilibrium.  A formal model, with hypotheses derived as implications 
of it (rather than via loose intuitions), is an essential feature of such a 
demonstration.64  Proceeding in this way also has its share of salutary 
byproducts, such as supplying a set of tight, internally consistent expectations, 
 
 63. See, e.g., FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT 
(2000); Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, May It Please the Chief?: Opinion Assignments in 
the Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 421 (1996); Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, 
Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
581 (1996); Paul J. Wahlbeck et al., Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on 
the United States Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294 (1998). 
 64. This is not to say that strategic analysis is synonymous with formalization.  Many 
different sorts of studies of courts can benefit from the mere incorporation of the logic of strategic 
action and can, in so doing, significantly enhance our understanding of judicial decision making.  
See, e.g., Epstein & Knight, supra note 3.  That does not, however, diminish the importance of 
formal analysis for attempts to explain a particular line of decisions or a substantive body of law 
as the equilibrium outcome of the interdependent choices of the judges and other actors. 
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which, in turn, may not sit comfortably with those derived on the basis of 
intuitive conjectures.  They may stand in direct contradistinction to those 
yielded via loose intuitions, or even if they comport with casual conjecture, the 
underlying logic behind them may be quite distinct.65 
To make these points, let us revisit Professor Merrill’s “hypothesis,” 
which, at bottom, suggests that we should see the first Rehnquist Court 
adopting the President’s (Solicitor General’s) position.  While the underlying 
logic behind this prediction may seem plausible, it is easy to show, using the 
simplest of spatial models,66 why it is problematic, or at best requires 
clarification.  We do so in Figure 1, which depicts Eskridge’s placement of the 
ideal points of key external actors over civil rights policy (Professor Merrill’s 
empirical reference point) during (roughly) the first Rehnquist Court.  Notice 
immediately that if the Court is composed of policy-oriented Justices (as 
Professor Merrill seems to maintain) it ought not place policy on its ideal point 
or on that of the President’s.67  Doing so would generate a congressional 
override because the key committees would see that they could introduce 
legislation at V (the ideal point of the pivotal veto player in Congress).  And 
“[s]uch legislation,” as Eskridge writes “would not only be approved by 
Congress but also would survive an expected veto.”68  Accordingly, we would 
expect the Court to act in a sophisticated fashion, placing policy not on its or 
the President’s most preferred point, but on or to the left of V.  In this light, 
Professor Merrill’s empirical findings—that the Court adopted the position 
advocated by the Solicitor General in less than 50% of the cases and that its 
rejections were in a liberal direction—are hardly a surprise.  They are precisely 
what hypotheses derived formally, rather than intuitively, would predict. 
 
 65. For an interesting and pointed example, see Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, 
Opinion Assignment in the Supreme Court: Theory and Evidence (Aug. 26, 2001), available at 
http://pro.harvard.edu/papers/026/026002LaxJeffrey.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2003). 
 66. Spatial models, as exemplified in Figures 7 and 8, help scholars investigate how the 
decisions of one actor may influence those of another (or others).  For a good introduction, see 
PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (1986). 
 67. For all the assumptions underlying our interpretation, see supra note 55. 
 68. Eskridge, Reneging on History?, supra note 55, at 653. 
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FIGURE 7 
 
Eskridge’s Civil Rights Preferences, 1981-199069 
 
 
          C(M)          C                M                 V                J 
               P 
  
Left Right 
 
Note: C(M) represents the committees’ indifference point (between their most 
preferred position and that desired by M); C is the most preferred position of 
the key current committees (and other gatekeepers) in Congress that make the 
decision of whether or not to propose legislation to their respective houses; M 
denotes the most preferred position of the median member of Congress; V 
represents the most preferred position of the pivotal veto player in Congress; J 
is the most preferred position of the median member of the Court; and P 
denotes the most preferred position of the President. 
Now, we realize that Professor Merrill might object to our interpretation, 
claiming that the Solicitor General also would act in a sophisticated fashion 
and present positions that reflect V, not P.  We know, however, of no 
contemporary account of the separation of powers system that adopts this 
position, and probably for good reason: it is easy to see what problems might 
ensue for the President (Solicitor General)—electoral or otherwise—if he 
presents insincere positions to the Court.  Conversely, it is far less transparent 
to see what he might gain.  Providing the Justices with information about 
congressional preferences so that their decision survives does not strike us as 
one such position.  After all, presumably the Justices also have knowledge of 
the overall composition of Congress and, thus, already know how far they can 
go in making policy pronouncements. 
Nonetheless, perhaps Professor Merrill is right.  Here, too, however, we 
would insist on a formal demonstration of this proposition—one showing the 
relative costs and benefits of insincere and sincere behavior on the part of the 
Solicitor General.  Were Professor Merrill to demonstrate the veracity of his 
intuition formally (and empirically), he would make a substantial contribution 
to literature on the separation of powers system. 
 
 69. Id. at 653 fig.3. 
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D. Data and Methodology 
As our stress on “empirically” above suggests, once political scientists 
derive observable implications—whether loosely or informally—their next 
task is to assess them against data— whether those data are qualitative or 
quantitative in nature.  This is a central feature of the political science project 
on judging, and one too that may trace directly to Pritchett: When he sought to 
assess his hypotheses against data, he set the tone for generations of political 
scientists who study courts.  We are now, as Pritchett was, consciously 
empirical, placing a great deal of emphasis on the degree to which data support 
our theories. 
At the same time, our approach to assessing the implications of our 
theories has matured with time.  Great bodies of literature have emerged to 
deal with crucial features of empirical research, be they the measurement of 
variables,70 the tools for analyzing data,71 and the techniques for depicting 
results,72 to name just three. 
What we focus on here is yet another area where we have made progress: 
the data themselves.  When Pritchett and his immediate successors sought to 
explore political approaches to judging, they coded and collected their own 
data without fully evaluating their procedures or worrying too much about 
whether others could evaluate them.  That would (or, perhaps more accurately, 
should) not fly today.  Contemporary researchers must, at the very least, take 
all steps necessary to ensure compliance with the replication standard: 
Another researcher should be able to understand, evaluate, build on, and 
 
 70. The literature on measurement is indeed immense, with entire fields of study devoted to 
measuring psychological well-being, health, income, education, happiness, survey responses, 
intelligence, and numerous others.  For applications in the context of judging, see, e.g., Epstein & 
King, supra note 4; Lee Epstein & Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 261 (1996); Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 66 (2000); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989); Micheal W. Giles et al., Picking 
Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623 (2001). 
 71. Again, the number is immense.  For interesting applications in the context of judging, see 
Andrew D. Martin, Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers, 95 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 361 (2001); Martin & Quinn, supra note 49; James F. Spriggs, II & Thomas G. 
Hansford, Explaining the Overruling of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, 63 J. POL. 1091 (2001); 
Christopher J.W. Zorn, Generalized Estimating Equation Models for Correlated Data: A Review 
with Applications, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 470 (2001). 
 72. For a recent example, see King et al., Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving 
Interpretation and Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 341 (2000); for applications in the context of 
judging, see Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Norm of Prior Judicial 
Experience (and Its Consequences for the U.S. Supreme Court), 91 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
July 2003); Martin & Quinn, supra note 49. 
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reproduce the research without any additional information from the author.73  
Why we insist on this standard is no great mystery.  In a broad sense, its point 
is to ensure that a published work stands alone so that readers can consume 
what it has to offer and evaluate it without any necessary connection with, 
further information from, or beliefs about the status or reputation of the author.  
The replication standard keeps empirical inquiry above the level of ad 
hominem attacks on or unquestioning acceptance of arguments by authority 
figures. 
Much is involved in meeting the standard, and frankly, few individual 
data-collection enterprises on judging fully succeed.  Perhaps that is why 
political scientists working in this field have turned in droves to the so-called 
“multi-user” databases.  The idea behind these is straightforward enough: 
Rather than collect data designed to answer particular research questions — 
such as those Professor Merrill raises (for example, how might we explain the 
decline in the number of opinions written by the Court, what accounts for the 
decrease in the number of judgments, why do we see a rise in the proportion of 
the docket devoted to federalism matters, and so on)—amass large databases 
so rich in content that multiple users, even those with distinct projects, can 
draw on them and amass them in accord with all the best scientific practices 
and procedures.74 
Several multi-user databases pertaining to courts now exist75 and others are 
in progress.  Certainly the most important and influential, however, is “The 
Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database”76 or, as it is 
commonly called in political science circles, “The Spaeth Database.”  Actually, 
this is not one but a series of databases developed by Harold J. Spaeth, a 
Michigan State political scientist and University of Michigan law graduate, 
that contain many attributes of Supreme Court decisions handed down since 
1946,  ranging from the date of the oral argument to the identities of the parties 
to the litigation, to how the Justices voted.77  Specifically, all Spaeth databases 
 
 73. We derive this paragraph from Epstein & King, supra note 4, at 38-44; Gary King, 
Replication, Replication, 28 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 444 (1995). 
 74. In addition to these benefits, large public-use databases have what is known a 
combinatoric advantage.  See Epstein & King, supra note 4, at 21-23. 
 75. See, e.g., The Program for Law and Judicial Politics, Research Databases and Data 
Archives, available at http://www.polisci.msu.edu/pljp/databases.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2003) 
[hereinafter Research Databases and Data Archive].  For more information about the databases, 
see Sara C. Benesh, Becoming an Intelligent User of the Spaeth Supreme Court Databases 
(2002), available at http://www.polisci.msu.edu/pljp/sctdata1.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2003). 
 76. The Program for Law and Judicial Politics, The Original United States Supreme Court 
Database, 1953-2001 Terms, available at http://www.polisci.msu.edu/pljp/sctdata1.html (last 
updated Feb. 11, 2003). 
 77. For a full list of attributes (variables) in the Spaeth database, see Harold J. Spaeth, The 
Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-2001 Terms: Documentation 
(Sept. 25, 2002), available at http://www.polisci.msu.edu/pljp/sctdata1.html (last visited Mar. 4, 
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contain (at minimum) nearly 250 variables, grouped into six sets: votes and 
opinions, background, chronology, substance, outcome, and identification of 
the cases. 
We list the basic variables in Table 1, even though any such listing cannot 
do justice to the richness of some of Spaeth’s codings.  Take, for example, his 
“issue” variable: It identifies “the subject matter of the controversy” as falling 
into one of scores upon scores of specific and discrete categories.  In the area 
of criminal procedure alone there are well over hundreds of distinct issues, 
including “speedy trial,” “right to counsel,” and “cruel and unusual 
punishment” (with separate values for death and non-death penalty related 
cases).  His “party” variable contains nearly two hundred categories from 
“accused person” to “witness” and just about everything in between.  The 
database even houses a variable of particular value to Professor Merrill’s 
project, “natural court,” or the term political scientists use to describe periods, 
such as the one between 1994 and the present, during which no personnel 
change occurred on the Court.  While the inclusion of such a variable may 
seem unnecessary—after all, it would appear simple enough to generate from 
existing variables (for example, “term”) via a few commands in most any 
statistical software packages (for example, “compute” or “recode” in SPSS)—
Spaeth, with characteristic care, explains why this is emphatically not the case: 
Scholars have subdivided [natural courts] into “strong” and “weak” natural 
courts, but no convention exists as to the dates on which they begin and end.  
Options include 1) date of confirmation, 2) date of seating, 3) cases decided 
after seating, and 4) cases argued and decided after seating.  A strong court is 
delineated by the addition of a new justice or the departure of an incumbent.  A 
weak court, by comparison, is any group of nine justices even if lengthy 
vacancies occurred.  Thus . . . the first thirty months of the Burger Court 
comprise three strong natural courts, but only one weak one: the eight justices 
who sat during the 1969 term, the addition of Blackmun at the very end of the 
1969 term, and the seven-member Court that sat from the retirements of Black 
and Harlan at the beginning of the 1971 term until the arrival of Powell and 
Rehnquist a few months later.  These thirty months comprise a single weak 
natural court because only nine justices sat during this period, even though 
only six of the nine held membership from its beginning to its end.78 
 
2003) [hereinafter Supreme Court Judicial Database Documentation].  The data themselves may 
be found at The Program for Law and Judicial Politics, U.S. Supreme Court Databases, available 
at http://www.polisci.msu.edu/plpj/sctdata1.html (last visited March 26, 2003).  The listing in 
Table 1 is from the “original” Spaeth Database.  See Supreme Court Judicial Database 
Documentation, at iv-vi.  Since creating it, Spaeth (with various collaborators) has produced 
several others, which are also available at the Web site.  See Research Databases and Data 
Archive, supra note 75. 
 78. Supreme Court Judicial Database Documentation, supra note 77, at 30 (citations 
omitted). 
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TABLE 1 
 
Outline of Variables in the Spaeth Databases 
 
identification variables 
1, 2, 3. case citations 
4. docket number 
5. unit of analysis 
6. number of records per 
unit of analysis 
background variables 
7. manner in which the 
Court takes jurisdiction 
8. administrative action 
preceding litigation 
9. three-judge district 
court 
10. origin of case 
11. source of case 
12. lower court 
disagreement 
13. reason for granting 
cert 
14, 15. parties 
16. disposition of case 
by court whose decision 
the Supreme Court 
reviewed 
17. direction of the 
lower court’s decision 
chronological variables 
18. date of oral 
argument 
19. reargument date 
20. decision date 
21. term of Court 
22. chief justice 
23. natural court 
SUBSTANTIVE 
VARIABLES 
24. legal provisions 
considered 
by the Court 
25. multiple legal 
provisions 
26, 27, 28. authority for 
decision 
29. issue 
30. issue areas 
31. direction of decision 
32. direction of decision 
based on dissent 
OUTCOME VARIABLES 
33. type of decision 
34. multiple 
memorandum decisions 
35. disposition of case 
36. unusual disposition 
37. winning party 
38. formal alteration of 
precedent 
voting and opinion 
variables 
39. declarations of 
unconstitutionality 
40. the vote in the case 
41. vote not clearly 
specified 
42-70. the votes, 
opinions, and 
interagreements of the 
individual justices 
71-99. the individual 
justice’s votes 
100-128. the individual 
justice’s opinions 
129-157, 158-186. the 
special opinion(s) with 
which the individual 
justice agreed 
187-215. direction of 
the individual justices’ 
votes 
216-244. majority and 
minority voting by 
justice 
245. majority opinion 
assigner 
246. majority opinion 
writer 
247. minimum winning 
coalition 
 
These complications required Spaeth to make some decisions about 
precisely how to define a “natural court,” settling ultimately on the following: 
  I have divided the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts into strong 
natural courts, each of which begins when the Reports first specify that the 
new justice is present but not necessarily participating in the reported case.  
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Similarly, a natural court ends on the date when the Reports state that an 
incumbent justice has died, retired, or resigned.79 
At the same time, however, he also provides users with an alterative: “In 
the description and listing of the natural courts below, I parenthetically 
designate the strong natural courts that constitute a weak natural court for those 
of you who prefer that focus.”80 
In short and taken collectively, Spaeth’s databases are “a virtual 
compendium of ‘anything anyone would ever want to know about the Court’—
or at least anything that is amenable to quantification.”81  Even so, this 
information, however comprehensive, would be nearly useless if it did not 
meet the replication standard—but it does.  Over the years, Spaeth has hired 
various assistants to replicate samples of the data, and the rates at which they 
agree with his codings are remarkable.  The reason, we suspect, is that he 
provides exhaustive definitions of the variables and their values.  This holds 
even for those as seemingly plain and obvious as case citations, as this excerpt 
from Spaeth’s documentation attests: 
 
Variables 1, 2, 3 
case citations (US, SCT, LED) 
  The three variables in these fields provide the citation to each case from 
the official United States Reports (US) and the two major unofficial Reports, 
the Lawyers’ Edition of the United States Reports (LED) and the Supreme 
Court Reporter (SCT).  The volume number precedes the slash bar; the page 
number on which the case begins follows.  When these citations appear in 
printed form, any zeros that precede any other cardinal number are dropped.  
Thus, the database LED citation, 086/0011, should be read as 86 L Ed 2d 11.  
Note that all LED citations are to the second series except for volumes 98, 99, 
and 100 which are cited without “2d.”  These three volumes cover the first 
three terms of the Warren Court (1953-1955).  Note that the database does not 
distinguish between citations to volumes 98, 99, and 100 of the first series and 
volumes 98, 99, and 100 of the second series.  The latter cover a portion of the 
1987 term.  This overlap should cause no trouble unless you use as a ‘select if’ 
command reference to these volumes of the LED. 
  All US and LED citations were copied directly from the published 
volumes.  SCT citations were derived from the conversion table to the United 
States Reports which is located in the front of the various volumes of the 
Supreme Court Reporter. 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Lee Epstein, Social Science, the Courts, and the Law, 83 JUDICATURE 224, 225 (2000).  
We adapt this paragraph and several to follow from this piece.  Id. 
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  Citations to the Lawyers’ Edition are current.  Those to the other two 
Reporters are not.  Because of the ready availability of case citations to the 
United States Reports and the Supreme Court Reporter I stopped entering 
these data a number of terms ago. 
  Not every record is cited to each source.  I do not find either Olin 
Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 352 U.S. 1020 (1957), or United States 
v. Louisiana, 409 U.S. 17 (1972), in the Lawyers’ Edition.  On the other hand, 
the United States Reports do not contain those cases in which a justice dissents 
from the granting of an attorney’s request for admission to the Bar of the 
United States Supreme Court.  E.g., In the Matter of Admission of Leda M.C. 
Hartwell, William Evans Benton, and Michael T. Rose, 71 L Ed 2d 641, 859, 
and 862 (1982), respectively.  Relative to the Court’s formally decided cases, 
this sort of memorandum decision is trivial.  Because citations to the Supreme 
Court Reporter are derived from a conversion table, as mentioned above, cases 
not cited in the United States Reports will have no parallel SCT citation, as 
will cases that the conversion table otherwise omits. 
  Pagination does not invariably proceed chronologically throughout the 
volumes.  Hence, do not assume that because a given citation has a higher page 
number than that of another case it was decided on the same or a later date as 
the other case.  The only accurate way to sequence the cases chronologically is 
by indexing or otherwise sequencing each case’s date of decision (DEC), 
variable 20.82 
At first blush, this level of detail may seem unnecessary, even fussy.  On 
deeper reflection, however, it is critical for all users and consumers of the data.  
That is so for several reasons, chief among them is that the “fussy” details 
facilitate replication and reproduction; it also makes it possible to build on 
Spaeth’s project.  However comprehensive his databases may be, some 
scholars will inevitably desire to analyze a variable it does not contain in 
conjunction with a variable(s) that it does.  Professor Merrill’s analysis of 
support for the Solicitor General provides an example.  While the Spaeth 
databases incorporate all the information Professor Merrill requires on issue 
areas and judicial votes, they fail to house data on the participation of the 
Solicitor General as an amicus curiae.83  Nonetheless, so long as the researcher 
has in hand a citation, the docket number, or some other identifier of cases in 
which the Solicitor General filed an amicus curiae brief, it is easy enough to 
add the variable or variables of interest to the database.84 
 
 82. Supreme Court Judicial Database Documentation, supra note 77, at 1-2. 
 83. It does, however, identify when the United States is a party to the suit.  See Spaeth’s 
party_1 and party_2 variables.  Id. at 16-27. 
 84. Some scholars have already have taken this step. See Segal & Reedy, supra note 43, at 
559. 
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By the same token, it is a trivial task to recategorize the values of Spaeth’s 
variables.  So, for example, if scholars take issue with the way that he has 
coded the direction of Court decisions (as liberal or conservative)—as some in 
the legal community have—they can correct whatever “problems” they 
perceive with simple commands common to virtually all statistical software 
packages (again, “recode” or “compute” in SPSS).  That they can do so is, yet 
again, a credit to Spaeth: his detailed documentation makes completely 
transparent his definitions of concepts such as “liberal” and “conservative.” 
We could go on extolling the virtues of the databases, but it is the larger 
point that should not be missed: Spaeth’s products meet all aspects of the 
replication standard.  Without consulting their developer, researchers can 
reproduce, replicate, and build on them—and they have.  The Spaeth databases 
are so dominating in our discipline that it would certainly be unusual for a 
refereed journal to publish a manuscript whose data derived from an alternate 
source.85  Even in the law reviews, virtually no empirical study of the U.S. 
Supreme Court produced by political scientists fails to draw on them. 
It is, thus, a mystery to us as to why the databases have not made greater 
inroads into the legal community; as to why law professors and their students, 
instead of relying on Spaeth’s efforts in part or in full, proceed as political 
scientists did some decades ago: they collect their own data.  Whatever the 
answers, we want to urge the legal community against continuing along this 
path.  Not only is it time consuming and duplicative, but it almost inevitably 
leads to data that do not meet the replication standard. 
We learned this when, for another project, we attempted to replicate a table 
in a source commonly used by legal academics (including Professor Merrill), 
the Harvard Law Review; specifically, the statistics it publishes in its annual 
reviews of the Court’s term.86  Even giving Harvard every benefit of the 
doubt—including focusing our replication efforts on a table we (and apparently 
Harvard87) thought would be the most straightforward to replicate—Table 
1(A) which lists the “Actions of Individual Justices”88—we could not even 
 
 85. Most empirical articles on judicial behavior, published over the last decade in the leading 
political science journals, avail themselves of one of the Spaeth databases.  For example, of the 
nine papers in the American Political Science Review (appearing between 1991-2000), 78% (n=7) 
relied on Spaeth’s data; that figure for the American Journal of Political Science over the same 
time is 88% (fifteen of seventeen).  Those that did not utilize the Spaeth databases typically relied 
on survey data or focused on the decisions of courts other than the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 86. See Epstein, supra note 81. 
 87. In fact, in its review of the 1967 Term—which Harvard says provides “[a] complete 
explanation” of how it compiles its tables, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—The Statistics, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 453, 453 n.a (2002)—it claims that “the construction” of this table “is 
accomplished primarily through tabulations as mechanical and simple as counting.”  The Supreme 
Court, 1967 Term—Business of the Court: The Statistics, 82 HARV. L. REV. 301, 302 (1968). 
 88. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—The Statistics, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453, 453 
tbl.1(A) (2002). 
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begin to reproduce it without serious detective work.  Even then, we still could 
not replicate it; we certainly could not update it. 
We faced similar problems with Professor Merrill’s data.  To provide but 
one example, consider his Figure 2, which contains information on the number 
of opinions written per Term, along with his description of the data-collection 
procedures: 
The numbers are taken from the statistics compiled in the annual Supreme 
Court volume of the Harvard Law Review published each November.  They 
reflect a category that the Review calls “opinions written,” which varies 
slightly from cases orally argued because it includes some per curium 
decisions in which the Court does not hear argument and excludes some cases 
that are dismissed after argument without a decision.89 
Despite Professor Merrill’s laudable efforts at explaining his research 
procedures, they are not replicable: another researcher could not understand, 
evaluate, build on, and reproduce them without talking to the students at the 
Harvard Law Review.  To see why, think about what information an 
investigator would need to know, but that the authors do not provide, to 
replicate their work.  A couple of the necessary questions would be: 
What is the unit of analysis?  That is, did the students at Harvard base their 
counts on docket numbers or case citations?  This question arises because 
occasionally the Court will consolidate several cases (with different docket 
numbers) under one citation, making it possible for a Justice to join, say, the 
majority with regard to one case, but the dissent in another, even if the citation 
is the same.  It is, however, not a question that Harvard explicitly answers.90  
This is unfortunate because, as Figure 8 shows, whether a researcher relies on 
docket numbers (that is, explodes cases within one citation) or citations can 
lead to different counts. 
 
 89. Merrill, supra note 2, at 579 n.21. 
 90. Harvard simply refers the reader to its review of the 1967 Supreme Court term for “[a] 
complete explanation of how the [table is] compiled.”  The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—The 
Statistics, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453, 453 n.a (2002).  This did, in fact, provide more detail but did 
not contain information about the unit of analysis. It was only by going back to its review of the 
1960 Term that we thought we found an answer: 
Table[] . . . IV deal[s] with those full opinions of the Court that dispose of the cases on the 
merits. Since it is not unusual for one opinion to dispose of more than one docketed case, 
the total number of full opinions, 118, is fewer than the number of cases listed [in a table 
dealing with the final disposition of cases]. 
The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Business of the Court, 75 HARV. L. REV. 83, 87 (1961) 
(footnote omitted).  While far from clear, this statement suggests that those compiling the 1960 
data used case citation as the unit of analysis; whether more contemporary students followed suit, 
we can only guess. 
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FIGURE 8 
 
Number of Supreme Court Cases by Citation and Docket Number91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What per curiam decisions counted as “opinions”?  The Harvard Law 
Review states that it includes only those per curiam decisions containing “legal 
reasoning substantial enough to be considered full opinions.”92  Almost 
needless to write, such a criterion does not meet any accepted or acceptable 
standards of scientific work with which we are aware.  What “substantial” 
reasoning means to the editors of the Harvard Law Review may be quite 
different from what it means to readers of this essay or to us.  It may even be 
the case that each class of Harvard Law Review students interpret it in distinct 
ways.  Accordingly, we, our readers, and the compilers of the data themselves 
might all select different per curiam decisions to incorporate into our counts. 
 
 91. We created this figure from the Spaeth database, using analu=0 (for case citations) and 
analu=0 or 1 (for docket number) and dec_type=1, 6, or 7. 
 92. The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—The Statistics, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453, 453 n.a (2002). 
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Perhaps out of recognition of this problem, Harvard provides a list of the 
per curiam decisions it includes.  Frankly, however, this does not help matters 
much because, in all likelihood, investigators (including the students 
themselves) would be unable to recreate its list for earlier or update it for later 
periods; “substantial” legal reasoning seems too imprecise of a phrase to admit 
replication. 
Worth noting is that neither of these issues would arise with the Spaeth 
database.  As for the unit of analysis, Spaeth lets the reader choose among 
several options, with the most relevant here being (0) case citation or (1) 
docket number.  As for the types of decisions (Spaeth’s DEC_TYPE variable), 
he also provides alternatives (listed below) from which the researcher could 
choose one or all seven: 
DEC_TYPE=1: Cases in which the Court hears oral argument and which it 
decides by a signed opinion. These are the Court’s so-called formally decided 
full opinion cases. 
DEC_TYPE=2: Cases decided with an opinion but without hearing oral 
argument; i.e., per curiam. 
DEC_TYPE=3: Memorandum cases.  These are summary decisions that deal 
with petitions for certiorari and appeals, requests of individuals and 
organizations to participate as amicus curiae, and various other motions, 
orders, and writs.  These are segregated from the other types of decisions by 
their location in the back of the various volumes of the United States Reports 
beginning at page 801 or 901 or later. 
DEC_TYPE=4: Decrees.  This infrequent type of decision usually arises under 
the Court’s original jurisdiction and involves state boundary disputes.  The 
justices will typically appoint a special master to take testimony and render a 
report, the bulk of which generally becomes the Court’s decision.  The 
presence of the label, “decree,” distinguishes this type of decision from the 
others. 
DEC_TYPE=5: Cases decided by an equally divided vote.  When a justice 
fails to participate in a case or when the Court has a vacancy, the participating 
justices may cast a tie vote.  In such cases, the Reports merely state that “the 
judgment is affirmed by an equally divided vote” and the name of any 
nonparticipating justice(s).  Their effect is to uphold the decision of the court 
whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. 
DEC_TYPE=6: This decision type is a variant of the formally decided cases 
(DEC_TYPE=1).  It differs from type 1 only in that no individual justice’s 
name appears as author of the Court’s opinion.  Instead, these unsigned orally 
argued cases are labeled as decided “per curiam.”  The difference between this 
type and DEC_TYPE=2 is the occurrence of oral argument in the former but 
not the latter.  In both types the opinion of the Court is unsigned; i.e., per 
curiam. 
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DEC_TYPE=7: Judgments of the Court.  This decision type is also a variant of 
the formally decided cases.  It differs from type 1 in that less than a majority of 
the participating justices agree with the opinion produced by the justice 
assigned to write the Court’s opinion.  Except for those interested only in the 
authors of the opinions of the Court, DEC_TYPE=7 should be included in 
analyses of the Court’s formally decided cases.93 
We could summon other examples of barriers to replication within 
Harvard’s data work94 but they would all lead to the same conclusion: If 
scholars want to collect their own data, then they must take as much care as 
Spaeth does to meet the replication standard.  Spaeth provides precise 
definitions of all the variables included in his database; Harvard provides, at 
most, bare clues and at minimum subjective criteria.  Based on Spaeth’s 
definitions we or any could easily reproduce his data and the results they yield; 
based on Harvard’s, we could not. 
Which, of course, leads us back to the question of why scholars—whether 
political scientists or law professors—working on the Supreme Court would 
collect their own data from scratch when so much of what they may require 
already is in Spaeth’s product.  Honestly, we cannot think of a single reason.  
Even if some of the variables of interest are not housed in Spaeth’s, we would 
bet that many others are, or could be adapted to the researchers’ requirements; 
whatever remains, as we suggest above, they could easily incorporate. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We want to end this piece much as we began it: We are all in Professor 
Merrill’s debt for advancing, perhaps even starting, a conversation between 
political scientists and law professors.  For, even though we may have been 
critical in spots, we truly believe Professor Merrill has performed a tremendous 
service for both communities of scholars. 
Indeed, he has executed his task so competently that he has made our work 
all the more.  It is now up to us, again whether in the law or political science 
world, to build on his foundation.  We have attempted to do so, briefly 
highlighting some of the key features of the political science project on 
judging—and we do mean briefly.  We have barely scratched the surface in 
terms of the overall project, leaving important topics nearly completely 
unaddressed.  Moreover, we have only minimally touched on a key insight in 
Professor Merrill’s paper—one centering on what he calls periods of 
 
 93. Supreme Court Judicial Database Documentation, supra note 77, at 58-59 (emphasis 
added).  Note that Spaeth provides (limited) advice on which to use.  For more comprehensive 
guidance, see Benesh, supra note 76. 
 94. For example, Harvard does not reveal the source of the data (whether it is U.S. Reports, 
LEXIS, etc.). For why this is important, see supra pp. 810-12, which contains Spaeth’s analysis 
of the citation variables in his data set. 
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membership “stasis” or what our colleagues in political science might deem as 
“natural courts”—preferring to set it aside for another paper in which we 
would have the space to do it justice. 
The next steps seem obvious.  First, we call on more political scientists to 
join the conversation that Professor Merrill has so ably and admirably moved 
forward.  Those of us who systematically study judging are a varied lot, and 
undoubtedly some among us will take issue with aspects of our description of 
the disciplinary project.  Law professors should hear their voices.  Likewise, 
political scientists ought to hear the voices of legal academics.  After all, if 
research is nothing else, it is a social enterprise: the advancement of knowledge 
depends on an active community of scholars working, not in isolation, but 
together in cooperation and competition.  Professor Merrill’s paper is a great 
example of this principle in action; we only hope that it will be the first of 
many more. 
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